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ABSTRACT

The main assumption of this thesis is that fascism is not an historical feature, nor a
geographical one. The premises for the rise of fascism are beyond time and space; it can
develop anywhere, anytime, in a certain context and under some conditions. These
context and these conditions are to be explained and described in this thesis. I will
compare the features of fascism in inter-war Europe with those of neo-fascism, and I will
also compare the features of Eastern European fascims with those of the Western Europe;
the main reason for these comparisons is that it was argued that fascim was just a
characteristic of the pre-World War I, and that after the end of the Cold War it has
developed only in the Eastern Europe because of the transition to democracy process. The
aim of this thesis is to contradict these hyupotheses. As case studies I have chosen
Austria and Romania because within these countries both features of fascism and neofascism have developed; and moreover, one country represents the Western democratic
Europe (membership of the EU), aand the other is a country in a process of transition
(candidate country at EU accession).
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Introduction
The assumption this thesis starts from is that the right-wing extremism is not finished
in Europe. Current explanations focus only on the former communist part of Europe,
arguing that the revival of the extremism is caused by the economic and social problems
those countries face through the process of transition (Braun 1997; Szayna 1997). Once
those problems are overcome, right - wing extremism will not be a source of concern any
longer. I assume that this type of understanding and approach to such a sensitive and
potentially dangerous issue is limited, and even damaging. The current right - wing
extremism reviving within Europe is neither a regional nor a temporal problem.
By the end of the World War II, the issue of the right - wing parties was very
sensitive around Europe and nobody would have dared by that time to predict their rise
and influence only 50 years later. But for the last ten to fifteen years all around Europe
the right- wing extremism has emerged unexpectedly, in the form of both social
movements and political parties. The 1980s saw the rise of a new wavei of right - wing
extremism across Western Europe. "The third wave of right - wing extremism has been
the most successful post - war period, in both an electoral and ideological sense, for right
- wing extremist parties almost everywhere" (Mudde 1996, 229).
The phenomenon of right - wing radicalism has developed once the Iron Curtain fell,
spreading around the former communist countries. Right - wing extremists have become
more and more visible across Europe. First by violent activities; then by increasing
electoral support; and finally, by entering legislatures. Right - wing extremist parties act
in each country, and they have an important word to say at the domestic politics level.
"The extreme right has become a relevant factor in West European politics both within
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the party system and outside of it (as, for example, the extreme right linked violence in
Germany, Austria and elsewhere)" (Mudde 2000, 6).
There is a need for studying the right - wing extremism not because it represents an
imminent threat to democracy or liberalism, but because it may become one. The simple
fact that it emerged again in Europe, even though it seemed to be proscribed for good,
should be seen as a warning signal. Extremism is not to be treated as a danger, but as a
serious potential threat. The unexpected victory of Freiheitliche Partei Oesterreichs
(FPOE) found Europe, and especially the European Union (EU) partner countries of
Austria, unprepared. The reaction was strong, sanctions have been raised against Austria,
but nobody knew where the roots of this happening should be looked for, and what type
of strategy was the most appropriate to be followed. Right - wing extremism should be
perceived as a potential danger, meaning that it must be correctly understood in order to
prevent its development towards threatening importance, and to be prepared with
comprehensive strategies for annihilating it, instead of ad-hoc strategies that do not heal
the causes.
Most of the scholars who studied the phenomenon of right - wing extremism
emergence after the end of the Cold War argued that it was a consequence of the fall of
communism, and that the right radicalism emerged only in the East European countries
where there was a different context given by the modernization and democratization
processes. But radical - right extremism is not a feature of the democratization process.
The first time when it emerged in Europe was in inter - war period and took to the
breakdown of most of the liberal democracies on the continent; it emerged not because of
the process of transition to democracy, but against democracy itself.
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In Fall 1999, when the FPOE entered the coalition in power, all the EU countries
were scared and hurried up to take tough diplomatic measures against Austria. These
reactions have been followed by some analyses about the causes and the consequences of
Raider's success, but only for a short period of time. Then the Western Europe became
silent. Austria seemed to keep working properly within the EU, and other such
happenings have not occurred in other Western European countries. The scholars focused
again on the Eastern European countries, considering them as the most exposed to the
danger of radicalism, almost completely ignoring the Austrian case.
What happened in Austria then? Nothing can arise without a cause. But the
arguments used for the rising radicalism in Eastern Europe are not appropriate for
Austria. The main assumption of this paper is that there are some common elements,
present both in Western and in Eastern European countries, which could determine the
emergence of the far - right anywhere in Europe. I will focus on identifying and
discussing these common elements in Western and Eastern Europe, which could have
influenced the rise of right - wing parties. The goal is to emphasize the fact that both
'sides' are exposed to the danger of radicalism.
My attempt in this thesis is to discuss that there is nothing in Eastern, as opposed
to Western Europe, which would make this part of the continent more exposed to the
dangers of the revival of the radical - right extremism. Moreover, I will argue also that
fascism is not just a feature of the inter - war Europe, and once that time passed, fascism
became also history. My aim is to show that the contemporary context could become a
favorable environment for the development of fascism.
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The main hypotheses of this thesis are that the European right - wing extremism
has the same roots all across the continent (without any major difference between East
and West), and that the same social perceptions and constructions determine the
contemporary right - wing extremism, as in inter - war Europe. There will be a twofold
argument is this research: that there are some common elements determining the
emergence of right-wing extremism all around Europe, without geographic or social
difference; and that the extremism is a lasting problem in Europe, not overcome at the
end of the Second World War.

Following the above observations, I will attempt to

identify the main elements of the right-wing extremism in Europe and to discuss possible
ways of avoiding fatal consequences of the right-wing extremism within contemporary
Europe.

1.1. Methodology

This is aimed to be a qualitative analysis of the roots of right- wing extremism in
Europe. It can be considered a comparative study because, as argued above, I will
investigate common elements of the right-wing extremism in Eastern and Western
Europe. Even though this research project aims to be a comprehensive one in the respect
of discussing the "faces" of right-wing extremism all around Europe, some cases will be
more emphasized at a moment or another of the discussion, because of their explicit
importance for the argument (France, Germany, Austria, Romania, Hungary).
It also can be considered a time - series approach because I will consider WWII as an

important intervening variable in the history of right - wing extremism. But no specific
quantitative method will be used. For the purposes of argument and debate, I will use
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surveys and electoral results, but only to sustain qualitative observations. I will also use
historical documents, speeches, empirical observations, biographies and memoirs of the
most important figures of the right-wing extremism in Europe.
The comparative method is the most appropriate one for the study of fascism because,
as it will be discussed later, the phenomenon of fascism have developed several and
different "faces" and "varieties"; and it is impossible to narrow down the analysis to a
single 'most comprehensive' case study. There is a need for the fascism to be understood
in the historical, social, economic context of each country or region where it developed in
order to have the whole picture of its features. The literature also emphasizes that,
paradoxically, fascism is the real internationalist movement of late 19th century and early
20th century. Even though Marxism was meant to be the movement of proletariat around
the world, it ended up by developing nationalist features and isolated revolutions.
Meanwhile, fascism, which was a movement with strong nationalistic roots and little
cosmopolitan vision, definitely developed into a European movement, some scholars
even arguing that it actually spread beyond the borders of the Old continent.
Tendencies of studying fascism from a comparative perspective have developed since
the beginning of the scholarly interest for this phenomenon. But for a quite long time
after the end of the World War Two, scholars have focused on Germany and Italy, trying
to identify their major features and then applying those findings to other cases. Only in
late 1970s, "the prospects for a comparative politics of fascism" have started to be
"reasonably bright" (Gregor 1976). This trend in the research of fascism was even more
emphasized and requested by the changes and realities of the 1980s. Once the "third
wave" of right - wing extremism spreading around Europe, scholars realized that the
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comparative approach would actually be the most useful in order to identify the roots and
the conditions of fascism emergence. Ever since, the study of fascism has been mainly
developed in a comparative perspective.

1.2. Definitions

One of the first things necessary in the discussion about radical - right extremism
and fascism is to define concepts. Most of the scholars in the field observe the lack of a
unanimously accepted definition of these terms; moreover, there are some who assume
that the concept of fascism itself should be eradicated from the political vocabulary. But
before going in-depth of this debate, the relationship between right - wing radicalism and
fascism should be identified. There are many attempts in the literature to describe or
define this relationship. Different approaches bring interesting nuances and useful details.
But since it is not the particular purpose of this thesis to focus on this relationship, for the
necessary conceptual framework I will focus on Cas Mudde's synthesis of previous and
various literature concerning this issue.
Mudde (1996) observes that most scholars include eight to ten features in their
definition of right - wing extrernismii; he further identifies three approaches to right wing extremism definition. The quantitative approach is the one where "all features are
considered equally important and only one criterion is used: the number of features". The
qualitative approach emphasizes one or more feature(s) that has (have) to be present in

order to accept the existence of right - wing extremism. The third approach, called "the
mixe<f' one, is a combination of the previous two; the scholars using this approach define
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a phenomenon as 'right - wing extremism' by counting the number of 'important'
features of right - wing extremism present in that phenomenon.
There are also some conceptual overlappings and confusions. "Right - wing
radicalism or radical right is the predecessor of the term right - wing extremism, and is in
fact most often used interchangeably. The difference between radicalism and extremism
is that the former is 'only' verfassungsfeidlich (in opposition to the principles of the
constitution), whereas the latter is verfassungswidrig (unconstituional)" (Mudde 1996,
12). In this line of linguistic clarifications, Ramet observes that "the term radical right is
used interchangeably with the terms ultraright and extreme right and is generally applied
to twenty- century incarnations of organized intolerance" (Ramet 1999, 4).
In the 1990s, the terminology referring to right - wing extremism expanded and

such concepts as "national - populism, right - wing populism, radical right - wing
populism" and so on have started to be used. The scholars either do not clearly
distinguish between right - wing populism and right - wing extremism, or they use the
former concept when focusing "more on the political style and less on the anti democratic feature(s)" of the parties in question (Mudde 1996, 232).
Mudde (1996, 2000) developed the concept of "party families" which include
political parties "across countries predominantly on the basis of their ideology". He
evaluates a comprehensive literature on the criteria and classifications that could be used
in order to include a party in one "family" or another. This evaluation brings to two
important results: on one hand Mudde (1996) elaborates a list of parties that are
commonly considered as belonging to the right - wing extremism "family" in Western
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Europe (see Table 1). On the other hand he draws the conclusion that fascism is the
ideological basis on which the "family" of right - wing extremism is created.
The literature has established "a number of common characteristics and ideology"
shared by the right - wing extremist "political family": "nationalism, racism, anti Semitism, intolerance of certain ethnic minorities ... anticommunism, anti pluralism, antiAmericanism (read anti-Westernism as a whole), and antidemocracy" (Williams 1999,
29). All these features are only other words for establishing an ideological connection
between right- wing extremist parties and fascism (Ebata 1997a; Ignazi 1997).

The ideology of fascism will be broadly discussed in the following chapter. This
review of the literature will be developed in two parts: first the concept of ideology will
be approached, with the specific goal to identify whether and how fascism can be defined
as an ideology. Then I will concentrate on the "fascism minimum", namely on the core
characteristics which could be understood as the fundamentals of the fascist ideology.
In the next chapter I will address the question of neo - fascism, discussing
questions such as: whether it is a natural development of the traditional fascism or
something completely new; what it shares with the traditional fascism, if anything; if not,
whether it may be called fascism; and whether there is such differentiation as traditional I
neo - fascism at all, or we may speak only about fascism. These questions will be
addressed at three levels or from three perspectives: micro, meso, and macroiii. The first
refers to individual motivations; the second involves local factors, and the third focus on
wider, international elements, all of them contributing to the birth and development of
fascism.
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In this chapter I will investigate one of the hypotheses of this thesis, namely that
the fascism cannot be temporarily defined; I will discuss the approaches which
understand fascism as either an inter - war or a post - communist feature. I argue that
fascism cannot be historically defined and that its emergence has nothing to do to with
some specific historical settings. The fourth chapter will investigate the second
hypothesis of this thesis, namely that fascism cannot either be defined geographically.
The argument will by symmetrical with that of the previous chapter, but the focus will be
on the East - West dichotomy. I will argue that such a dichotomy does not characterize
the phenomenon of fascism. The fifth chapter will focus more on two cases, even though
concrete examples and cases will be addressed and discussed all along the thesis. I
consider Austria and Romania worth and appropriate to be used in order to enforce the
findings and the arguments of the research because they share an inter - war fascist
experience, a fascist revival experience, they also represent the East and West, one being
a long - term democracy, the other struggling on the democratization way. This chapter
will also bring into the spotlight the most recent developments in the rise of right - wing
parties and candidates across Europe for the last years.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1. Fascism as ideology

The concept of ideology itself was at stake in the 1950s and 1960s, when a long
intellectual debate developed among the scholars whether this concept should be used
any longer and whether it meant anything after all. One of the scholars who stood up for
the significance and the relevance of the concept of ideology was Joseph LaPalombara
(1966). He observes that there are three fundamental weaknesses in the literature
suggesting "the end of ideology"iv. First LaPalombara asserts that this idea of "the
exhaustion of political ideas in the West refers to that particular case involving the
disillusionment experienced by the neo - Marxist intellectuals". The second weakness is
the narrow focus of those scholars on the Western countries. They overlook the
intellectual potential of a "broader comparative ideological analysis". And, as a third
weakness, LaPalombara discusses the theory of "the end of ideology" as an ideology on
its own. He further emphasizes the continuous emergence of new myths, new symbols
and new vocabulary. This process may not be called 'end of ideology' but 'change of
ideology', which is something different.
Other scholars elaborate means of evaluating whether a particular political
thinking may be labeled 'ideology' or not. Burks (1949, 183) develops a "conception of
ideology for historians" where he mentions as being important and relevant elements for
an ideology an inclusive interpretation of human history and a highly articulated theory
of the social order. Burks also assumes that a 'good' ideology should 'inculcate these
ideas by means of an educational system and an appropriate hagiolatry. Moreover, an
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ideology should posses mass allegiance and should also be identified with the policy and
interests of a major power. Macridis (1983) divides political ideologies into three
categories - status quo, radical or revolutionary, and reformist - and then he identifies
some criteria of evaluating ideologies - coherence, pervasiveness, extensiveness, and
intensiveness. Ingersoll and Matthews (1991) put the concept of political ideology in the
perspective of the political philosophy. And they observe that "an ideology also attempts
a meaningful analysis of the existing environment so as to discover real truths concerning
humanity"; from this perspective, an ideology has more in common with the traditional
political philosophy than with the modem one. The most important characteristic
ideology and traditional political philosophy share is the orientation toward action; both
of them aim to explain the world and the human behavior, and then they offer a variant to
alter the existing order, having as final purpose the improvement of human life. Ingersoll
and Matthews (1991) identify three functions of an ideology: to simplify the view of the
world; to demand action either for (when out of power) or against (when in power)
change; and to justify the course of action taken as well as the view of the world
established.
The question is how fascism fits in these approaches and understandings of
ideology. What type of ideology is it, if any? Which are its major characteristics?
Fascism itself has been a controversial concept, some scholars considering that it has
always been too fluid to be evaluated as a political ideology, other scholar emphasizing
that there have been so many varieties of fascism that one is not able any longer to
distinguish a core of characteristics in order to define the ideology. Joes (1978) identified
three types of objections to the study of fascism. The first category contains the rejection

17

of fascism "on deeply emotional grounds", namely on the repugnance and revulsion
toward the horrors caused especially by the Nazis in Germany and in the world. In the
second category are included those approaches that understand fascism as "an important,
if bizzare, phenomenon in Europe of the period 1918 - 1945, but which has been
fortunately defeated and uprooted". The third category of objections simply considers
fascism "without any useful meaning" (foes 1978, 3). Allardyce (1979) develops an
argument against all three meanings of the concept fascism - generic concept, political
ideology, personality type, asserting that all three have been artificially constructed to
define and describe a non - entity. Allardyce (1979) argues that fascism is not an
ideology because of two reasons. On one hand it is difficult first to identify the true
intellectual roots of fascism and then to connect them with the "men of action" of the
fascist movements, especially Mussolini and Hitler. On the other hand the content of
fascist ideology itself is very fluid, no written or coherently elaborated into a doctrine left
behind as legacy by the founders of fascism.
The supporters of the idea that fascism is an ideology included it in the 'isms'
gallery of the intellectual thinking at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the
20th century. Fascism became as relevant and worth to be studied as communism,
socialism, liberalism, marxism. Furthermore, it was included in the broader concept of
totalitarianism developed between 1940s and 1960s primarily by Hannah Arendt (1951),
Carl Friedrich and Zbigniev Brzezinski (1956).
The main suggestion of totalitarianism studies was that the most important
ideological and political division in the 20th century was not so much that between left
and right as that between Western pluralism and all kinds of totalitarianism. These
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approaches put fascism in a very long intellectual tradition, and also at the same level of
importance with other doctrines that made the modern history of the world. But
"totalitarianism never sought to explain fully the origins and complexities of fascism and
the rest of the political extreme right, and certainly does not so" (Blinkhorn 2000, 101).
The totalitarian concept does not offer a comprehensive definition and explanation for the
roots of fascism; it only places fascism on the opposite side of Western liberal democracy. This approach has its roots in the 1930s research, when scholars assumed that
"mature capitalism had two and only two, alternative outcomes as historical possibilities:
socialism or fascism" (Gregor 1976). One of the criticisms brought to the concept of
totalitarianism was that "it is implicitly indifferent to empirical research on the nature of
the 'isms' from the standpoint of their differential socio - economic consequences"
(Groth 1964).
One ideological observation which should be made is that "there is a fundamental
divide between the extreme right and conservative parties that embrace economic
liberalism with touches of traditionalism in social outlooks" (Szayna 1997, 114). In this
respect an important differentiation was made "between fascist movements per se and the
nonfascist (or sometimes protofascist) authoritarian right" (Payne 1980). He observes that
fascist, radical right and conservative right differ among themselves in a variety of ways:
philosophy, military use, approach to modern economic development. Payne asserts that
fascism might be situated in between the other two political orientations; in order to
emphasize this classification, Payne develops a table with the most important parties and
movements across Europe in the inter- war period (see Table 2). Linz (1976) observes in
this respect that "the ideology and above all the rhetoric appeals for the incorporation of a
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national cultural tradition selectively in the new synthesis in response to new social
classes, new social and economic problems, and with new organizational conceptions of
mobilization and participation, differentiate them from conservative parties".
Beside the debate about the appropriateness of the concept of 'ideology', the
fascism itself lacks the manifesto, the program most ideologies have, and that exposes it
to criticism and controversy. But if it is to follow the elements and classifications
mentioned above, it may be observed that fascism presents most of the characteristics of
an ideology. The starting assumption of this study is then that fascism is an ideology; the
next step is to try to identify what features define this ideology.

2.2. The fascist minimum

There has been no unanimously accepted definition of fascism established. Paxton
(1998) argues that there are five major difficulties in the attempt to elaborate any
definition of fascism ideology. The first one is "a problem of timing", meaning that the
phenomenon was unexpected at the time when it arise and in consequence it has been
poorly understood since the beginning. The second difficulty is the "mimicry", namely
the fact that there are many movements and parties that all claim to have a fascist
ideology even though their common points are few. Moreover, these individual cases are
spread in space and time, so it is even more difficult to find shared characteristics and
elements. Another difficulty is the fact that the fascist doctrine lacks a founding
document or manifesto containing its major points. In consequence the actions taken by
fascist leaders represent at the same time the manifesto of the ideology. The last difficulty
is given by the "overuse" of the concept of fascism itself.
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Despite these difficulties, there have been some attempts to encompass the
features of fascism in short definitions. Eatwell (1996) describes this quest for some
essential features and characteristics of fascism as "fascist minimum". The term was
introduced in fascist studies by Ernst Nolte in the 1960s; he defined his "fascist
minimum" as a combination of six points: "antimarxims, antiliberalism, the
Fuehrerprinzip, the militarized party, the tendency to anticonservatism and the goal of
totalitarianism" (Nolte 1968, 385). Since the 1960s, several scholars have tried to identify
the most valuable and comprehensive "fascist minimum". Some developed short
definitions, some emphasized some key concepts. Even though none of these attempts are
unanimously considered as the final answer, Griffin's definition is one of the most
appreciated in the literature. He holds that "fascism's mythic core in its various
permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra - nationalism" (Griffin 1995, 4).
Despite the fact that he introduces two other controversial concepts in this definition
(populism and nationalism), Griffin emphasizes the idea of 'myth' which is an important
element of the fascist propaganda and ideology, and which, surprisingly, has been in most
part ignored by scholars. Another important point is that he underlines the palingenetic
aspect of fascism, considering it an everlasting political phenomenon.
Eatwell (1996) develops both a short definition and a "four - point core set of
annotations". He assumes that "an ideology that strives to forge social rebirth based on a
holistic-national radical Third Way, though in practice fascism has tended to stress style,
especially action and the charismatic leader, more than detailed programme, and to
engage in a Manichean demonisation of its enemies". Ebata (1997a, 21) considers
fascism as being "an ideology based on natural history, the pursuit of an expansionary
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and aggressive geopolitical policy, and corporate statism". Linz (1976, 16) opens a line of
definitions a contrario of fascism. He speaks of fascism as being an anti movement; "it
defines itself by the things against which it stands ... which can be summarized as follows:
anti - Marxist, anti - communist, anti - proletarian, but also anti - liberal, anti parliamentarian, and in a very special sense, anti - conservative, anti - bourgeois".
Paxton (1998) asserts that the main cause why fascism could not have been
comprehensively defined was the way it has been approached. He says that previous
attempts of defining were characterized by " a static and isolated manner". Instead of this
approach, he comes up with a definition of fascism in "five stages". The attempt of this
definition is to describe the trajectory of right - wing extremist parties from their
emergence through the "dual power". The first stage is the initial creation that usually
arises within a sufficiently implanted democracy. Next, the movement will become a
party, and as a consequence, the third stage is the acquisition of power that most
commonly happens within a weak liberal state and a political deadlock. Next the
extremist parties will exercise power and finally they will evolve in either of two
directions: radicalization or entropy. Paxton's description is applicable to the fascist
emergence in the inter - war period but not to neo - fascism. If it is to apply these stages
to the contemporary right - wing extremism features, almost none of them fit. But
Paxton's model offers the valuable alternative of a dynamic study of fascism. Since there
are several variants of fascism, and since it is such a spread phenomenon in time and
space, this type of approach would be the most appropriate and could provide a more
comprehensive picture of fascism.
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The list of definitions could be even longer, each of them adding new points or
emphasizing some of those already mentioned. This thesis does not aim to establish a
new or a more comprehensive definition of fascism; it only aims to argue that this is a
phenomenon that did not disappear in the post World War Two era, and that it is likely to
emerge all around Europe, without any geographical difference. An inherent consequence
of this approach is that certain features will be identified, which could be considered
another "fascist minimum". Those features would have passed the test of time and
geography, so they might provide a step forward in the process of looking for the 'right'
definition of fascism.
Since there are no written fascist manifesto and no comprehensive fascism
definition, several interpretations or approaches have developed in order to explain
fascism emergence and features. Again, there are numerous schools of thought and
theories dealing with fascism roots and emergence. For instance, Ebata (1997a, 22)
identifies "social - psychological theories; socioeconomic theories; political theories; and
international, or global, theories"; Mudde (1996) distinguishes four schools: the Marrxist
school, the extremism - theoretical school, the modernization school, and the 'new
politics' school. These theories can be summarized in five major trends.
There is first the uniqueness theory that assumes that fascism manifested only in
the inter - war and once WWII over, Europe overcame the danger of any emergence of
fascism (Payne 1980). Another important theory is the Marxist one, which developed into
a real school of thought because Marxism and fascism were the two rivals in polarizing
the society when democracy was at stake. At the basis of the theory are the formulations
of the Hungarian Communist Gyula Sas and the German Clara Zetkin. They developed
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their understanding of fascism in 1923, and later their view became the standard Third
International interpretation of fascism "as a violent, dictatorial agent of bourgeois
capitalism" (Gregor 1974; Payne 1980). The most controversial theory is the
modernization theory; some scholars arguing that fascism represented a trend against the

changes in the society and toward conservatism and preservation of traditional values
(Turner 1972). Other scholars understood fascism in exactly the contrary way, as a result
of the modernization phenomenon (Gregor 1973), and others suggested that that in some
underdeveloped countries fascism was a modernizing force, but turned against the
modernization process in countries like Germany that were already industrialized
(Cassels 1974).
The next theory, the psychosocial - psychological one, starts from the assumption
that certain personality characteristics made individuals more exposed to become
fascism's supporters; or that some social contexts enhance these likeliness. Fromm
(1941) exposed the thesis of some feelings developed by the inter - war middle class
which transformed them into fascists - isolation, impotence, anomie, and frustration.
Reich (1930) developed this approach into something more Freudian, emphasizing the
psychosexual explanation. Nathan (1943) is another important scholar who applies
Freudianism to fascist attitudes. His main assumption is that individuals develop with the
leaders the same relationship as they developed with their parents during childhood.
Nowadays this type of approach is still in fashion, Durin (2000) developing a
comprehensive psychoanalytic study of Hitler and his followers, using psychological and
Freudian principles. The most important research within this theory was that conducted
by Adorno et al. (1950), where they tried to establish a scale of measurement for the
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"authoritarian personality". Their study is not based on Freud's theories, and it is an
attempt to create a scientific framework for the study of the involvement of psychosociology in fascism support.
The last theory is the managerial revolution, controversial at its turn because
some scholars argue that fascism is the revolution of the new managerial elite and it
represents "the triumph of the technocrat and the expert" (Macridis 1983, 38). On the
other hand there are scholars arguing that "no point remained less clear in the doctrines of
most fascist movements than economic structure and goals" (Payne 1980, 5). This theory
approaches fascism as the result of a new economic order, as the representative political
system within which new forms of economic organization and distribution develop.
As it has been shown above, the fascist minimum is very difficult to be identified.
The short definitions are not comprehensive, the lists of features are too fluid, and the
theories focus on specific elements involved in the fascist phenomenon, without a
synthesis perspective. In this paper, I will use the theories explained above in order to
identify the features of fascism in Europe in the inter - war period and in the 1980s 1990s.
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Chapter 3
Is Neo-Fascism an Oxymoron?
There is unanimously accepted that the "new" right - wing extremism has less to
do with the movements at the beginning of the 20th century. "Most of the big fascist
movements of the inter-war period grew from the terrible struggle, the defeat, and the
territorial losses of the war" (Merkl 1997, 24). The social problems and social contexts
were different at the end of a war which shuddered Europe. Mudde (2000, 16) speaks
about "waves" in the rise of extreme right parties and he assumes that 1980 - 2000 is the
'third wave' of post - war right - wing extremism, and "without a doubt the most
successful period in both the electoral and ideological sense for such parties in almost
every West European country".
One of the hypotheses of this thesis is that the 'neo' features of fascism do not
differ from those developed in the inter - war Europe. I assume that there is no such thing
as "traditional" and/or "neo" fascism; it is only the fascist ideology that uses particular
historical settings in order to gain support, and to spread. The main argument of this
study is that fascism was not only an inter - war feature, and it disappeared after the end
of WWII for good. My main hypothesis is that fascism could arise anywhere in Europe,
at any time, and that the increase in support for the right - wing parties and movements
only shows that maybe the time is ripe nowadays for Europe to face again the spectrum
of fascism. My assumption is that the fascist ideology and fascist features did not become
extinct; they only transformed and adapted to the post - modem man, society, and
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international context. As the title of this thesis suggests, fascism is still a ghost haunting
Europe.
The question is why those 'waves', discussed in the literature, have still emerged,
since fascism was defeated in the WWII, and how the success of the 'third wave' (in the
1980s - 1990s) can be explained. Kitschelt and McGann (1998, 1) identify from the
literature four hypotheses as possible answers to these questions. The first one is "a
revival of fascist and national socialist ideology in the midst of an economic crisis with
high unemployment". The second variant is "a single - issue racist and xenophobic
backlash against the multi - culturalization of Western European societies caused by the
influx of immigrants from non - Occidental civilizations, particularly from the Islamic,
African, and Far East regions". A third hypothesis focuses on domestic institutional
changes in advanced capitalist democracies and singles out the increasing control of
individual lives by a coalescing 'class' of political and corporate leaders as the trigger for
a ' right - libertarian' and 'populist' backlash against big government and consociational
or corporatist politico-economic elites." The last hypothesis is the one proposed by
Kitschelt and McGann (1998) themselves. They assume that "societal change in
contemporary capitalism has increased the salience of political partisan appeals to
economically rightist positions favoring market allocations over political redistribution of
economic resources."
These hypotheses and other approaches in the literature (discussed at different
points in this study) could be summarized in three general levels important for the reemergence and development of the fascism. I will follow these three lines in order to
emphasize certain characteristics of the inter - war fascism, and the way they are adapted
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and transformed in modem Europe. First, there is the individual level. At it will be shown
below, some personal characteristics and personality types are more likely to follow a
right - wing extremist line than others. Some individuals are more likely to become
fascists (or neo - fascist) than others. The second level is the societal level, namely the
observation that certain economic, social and even political trends and features in a
country will be more likely to become an appropriate context for the development of
fascism. The third level of analysis is the "macro" one, namely the general European or
even international elements and features that would influence the emergence and spread
of fascist ideology, movements, and parties.

3.1. ''Micro" perspective

As argued above, the first level of analysis is the individual level. One important
question would concern the supporters, the adepts of the right - wing extremism. Who
are they? Who were they in inter - war Europe? How different are they in the 1980s and
1990s, if different at all? My argument is that the same fundamental things that drove
people in the inter - war Europe toward fascism, are driving them nowadays toward the
same features, and will always drive them toward radicalism and extremism.
Fromm (1984) established a psychological portrait of the fascist supporters in the
inter - war period. They were middle class, especially lower middle class; their whole life
was based on the principle of scarcity - economically as well as psychologically. The
post - WWI period generated some factors that frustrated even more these types of
people. First, it was the economic decline of the old middle class. Then some
psychological considerations that increased their likeliness to support fascism: defeat in
war, downfall of the monarchy, the decline of the old social symbols of authority. Hitler
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and fascism

expressed for them a new form

of

'order',

'discipline',

and

'authoritarianism'. Moreover, it was a promise of national revival, of national fight for
the defeated pride during the previous world war.
The relationship between the psychological characteristics of a person and his
environment are an important part of the study of the prerequisites of fascism. Adorno et
al. (1950) developed the study "The Authoritarian Personality" about this relationship
and its dialectic. They consider that there is a link between the external economic and
social factors and the internal characteristics of the individual, so there cannot be an
exclusive approach to the Nazism phenomenon, either "micro" or "meso" - as I defined
the levels in this study. What Adorno et al. (1950) tried was to bring into the spotlight on
the "potentially fascistic person", taking into consideration both the internal and the
external factors, which influence the development of such a character.
First thing the authors discuss is the ideology. They assume that this cannot have
a direct and full influence on the individual because "an individual's susceptibility to this
ideology depends primarily upon his psychological needs" (Adorno et al. 1950, 221).
These needs are organized essentially in what one may call "personality" - so, the
authors assume then that "personality may be regarded as a detenninant of ideological
preferences". Following the logic of this argumentation, next thing to notice is that
"personality evolves under the impact of the social environment and can never be isolated
from the social totality within which it occurs" (Adorno et al. 1950, 241). This line of
reasoning brings to the conclusion that there is a certain socio - economic context more
likely to determine the awakening of certain "fascistic person". Not all the people within
the same socio - economic context would react the same to those conditions; there are
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certainly some people, already having some characteristics, who are more likely to adopt
and follow a radical extremist ideology.
One of the main findings of the study of Adorno et al. (1950, 232) is that: "the
soundest approach is to consider that in the determination of any ideology, as in the
determination of any behavior, there is a situational factor and a personality factor, and
that a careful weighing of the role of each will yield the most accurate prediction".
The second important finding of the study is the description and measurement tools
used by the scholars in order to approach "the ideological trends and methods for
exposing personality, the contemporary situation, and the social background." Their aim
is to measure "the quantification of antidemocratic trends at the level of personality". In
order to measure these anti - democratic trends, "the task was to formulate scale items
which, though they were statements of opinions and attitudes and had the same form as
those appearing in ordinary opinion - attitude questionnaires, would actually serve as
<giveaways> of underlying antidemocratic trends in the personality" (Adorno et al 1950,
222-241).
There have been derived and defined a number of variables, which taken together,
made up the basic content of the Fascism scale. These variables have been classified in 9
items - all together having 77 assumptions - and they have been correlated in order to
have the full picture of an antidemocratic personality and the factors, which would
determine this trend. As a conclusion, the authors consider that "the function of an
authoritarian ideology and practice can be compared to the function of neurotic
symptoms. Such symptoms result from unbearable psychological conditions and at the
same time offer a solution that makes life possible".
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One synthesis of the socio - psychological dispositions of the "neo - fascist
personality" is given by (Krejci 1995). He assumes that the first one is "the homogeneity
preference." People tend to develop certain limits of their openness toward different
cultures, languages and religions. They prefer to live and work with people sharing their
views and values. The second disposition is "the superiority complex which may often
be an overcompensation for the opposite - an inferiority complex"; and the third one is
"the wish to bring all the kin into the common fold". This tendency implies both unity
and the need for an authoritarian arrangement that would provide security, discipline,
order. The next disposition is the "people's instinctive resistance to socioeconomic
change." This tendency is best represented by "the distaste of the traditionally minded
lower middle class towards the encroachments of big business and finance upon their
way of earning a living". The last disposition is the "admiration of strength and heroism
which may develop into the cult of violence".
These are studies that emphasize the main socio - psychological trends in the
inter - war period and, respectively, in the last two decades. Most likely to be exposed to
fascist ideology and extremist features are those people feeling insecure, having
inferiority complexes, tending to identify themselves with powerful and heroic figures.
Nothing has changed in this respect for the last 50/ 60 years, in Europe at least. There are
still people perceiving themselves as insignificant, ignored by the system, weak,
frustrated - and those people look for strong authoritarian figures to identify with. They
are conscious about their lack of opportunities for social success, and they try either to
hide their inferiority under authoritarian and despotic behaviors toward even weaker
groups of people than themselves, or to support and promote authoritarian leaders and
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personalities who guarantee discipline and order. These personality characteristics have
not changed and they will never do because they are innate in the human nature. It is an
inconsistent argument to say that weak, frustrated and insecure persons emerged only in
the inter - war Europe. What differs indeed between that time and the last decades are the
economic and social conditions that contributed to the awakening of the fascist feelings.
But these differences will be discussed in the next part because they regard the meso
level of the development of fascism.
Before going further to develop those arguments, one thing must to be discussed that is the social categories most likely to support fascism. For the new emerging right wing, young people seem extremely relevant. Unlike in the inter - war period, when
middle age adults could not accept and understand the behavior of youth, trying to
reestablish traditional values by supporting fascism, in contemporary times, young people
are more likely to enroll in this type of movements. "There is little doubt that the vast
majority of new recruits to the various European radical right groups is male, lower class,
and very young. Being a radical right - winger seems to be highly related to the
difficulties of growing - up ... combined with being a lower class male in the decades of
the eighties and nineties" (Merkl 1997, 36). Young people are more exposed to social
insecurity (especially unemployment), and they also show "a particularly high level of
political alienation and disillusionment" (Harris 1994, 50).
If the age group differs from inter - war period, then the occupations and social

status will differ as well. The current supporters of the neo - fascism are in most part
students or young unemployed, or low paid workers. The most common profile of the
right - wing extremist voter nowadays in Europe is a man between 18 and 39 years old,
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and lower middle class employee (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000). This could have a
twofold development: either their support for radicalism will decrease along with their
aging, and then it can be assumed that the extremist manifestations are due to the rebel tendencies of the youth and to the imminent insecurity of the early years of one's life. Or
the support for neo - fascist features will increase along with their aging, and in those
cases there is not much to do. It is very much possible that these two tendencies coexist in
a society, and each country has the tools to influence which one of the directions will be
stronger. If the economic situation and the welfare policies will focus more on the youth
and on helping them at the beginning of their careers and lives, it is possible to observe a
decrease in the tendency of young people to keep the neo - fascist attitudes all their lives
long.

3.2. ''Meso" perspective
As argued above, the social and economic elements are very important in
determining the rise and development of fascist ideology and attitudes. From this
perspective the contemporary context is very much different from the one in inter - war
period. But what I intend to emphasize is that there are some general patterns and
elements shared by the societies in both periods of time, which mostly contributed to the
rise of fascism. And these common elements could emerge within any society at any
time, so the emergence of fascism does not remain strictly related to the inter - war
period of time.
Blum (1998, 183) summarizes the situation in Germany and Italy at the time
fascist movements and parties emerged. "Both countries were states in which the old
order had collapsed or no longer seemed to work. Democracy was either not deeply
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rooted or a system of government of short duration, and nationalist sentiment often ran
high. Worst of all, Italy and Germany faced the prospect of economic breakdown and
social disorder after the trauma of World War I." Is this the situation nowadays in the
European Union? Not at all. No economic breakdown, no war trauma, no social disorder.
The national sentiment could run higher now because of the pressure of the European
context. But all the other features are quite different.
Hainsworth (2000) discusses the features that could have influenced the rise of
right - wing for the last almost two decades. Immigration is definitely one important
phenomenon, especially when coupled with "unemployment and insecurity (in a broad
sense)"; these two happen in the context of European integration, and, moreover, in an
even more comprehensive process - that of globalization. The social lack of trust in the
institutions, the post - modem alienation of individuals, the uncertainty of tomorrow, the
emergence of new threats - those international - these are enough reasons to motivate the
accession of the right - wing extremism. Schmid (1996, 82-83) observes that "many
factors seem to indicate that today's rampant right - wing radicalism is clearly distinct
from the rightist extremism of the thirties ... " The main difference is that the current
extremism is "less a program than an aggressive feeling. Right - wing radicalism is also a
product of what could be called 'extreme normality' of this society. Boredom and satiety
play a bigger role here than real problems."
These observations bring to the conclusion that there is a major shift both in the
problems of society and, consequently, in the right - wing extremist discourse. After the
end of the World War Two, the situation in Europe was completely different than at the
end of the World War One. Europe started to move toward stabilization (Kindleberger
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1981; Luebbert 1987; Maier 1981; Schuker 1981). The new political and social important
issues in the process of stabilization were security, stability, and steady economic growth.
As a consequence, the new extremist parties and movements adapted their discourse and
their attitudes to this non - expansionist trend. In the inter - war period, invasion and
external territorial expansion were essential goals for the fascist parties (Blum 1998).
"Instead, the neo - fascist parties would focus ... on the domestic political enemy: on
those who were foreign, non - European, and non - white. They would target immigrants
and asylum - seekers who, by virtue of their non - European ethnicity, were diluting the
'national substance' and depriving 'honest' Europeans of jobs" (Wolin 1994, 15).
In consequence, the new emerging right - wing parties stress "their commitment
to representative democracy and the constitutional order" (Betz 1998, 4). He argues
further that the new right extremism is hostile "against the political class and the
administrative bureaucracy and their control over fiscal policy, and against the growing
number of social groups relying on claims to social rights to gains access to public
funding". What characterizes and differentiates the new extreme right (emerged in the
1980s) is the fact that it does not fight against the social order itself; it only claims "a
radical transformation of the socioeconomic and socio-cultural status quo" (Betz 1998).
From the above arguments, we may conclude that the new right - wing extremism
keeps the basic emotions and perceptions that generated fascism and extremism at the
beginning of the 20th century, but they turned towards new emerging social problems.
The new emerging right - wing extremist do not face either the war trauma or the
economic breakdown of the inter - war societies, and it switched the focus toward new
emerging problems in Europe, as immigration, unemployment and criminality.
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3.3. "Macro" perspective

As mentioned above, the international, macro context has an important role in the
development of the new fascist features. First, there are the feelings of frustration
generated by the globalization process and the international connections. On one hand,
people feel that they are even more insignificant in the global context, on the other hand
they assume that both their individual identity and their national identity are endangered
during these processes. Second, "having realized that military aggression and conquest
are no longer feasible, neofascism has opted for the defense of Europe" (Laqueur 1996,
93). They are not interested in the present Europe, many of the neo - fascist rejecting the
idea of the European union or most of the features of membership. They focus and praise
more the Europe of the future, which will be created under their leadership. This aspect
will be emphasized in the next subchapter.
The international context has much more influence on the contemporary fascist
movements because it is different than in the inter - war era. At that moment, fascists
claimed to oppose and fight mostly the rising Socialism and Communism (seen mainly as
Jewish channels of manipulation) and, in a secondary less important position, the
American influence in Europe. As it will be discussed in more detail later in the study,
the Left has been defeated in Europe, especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain; it does
not represent a threat or a valuable enemy any longer. The American influence is less
visible, it is more the cultural values that spread, but not especially in Europe, but across
the world. The American threat is also weak and could not sustain the radical discourse.
In consequence, the new fascists focus on a broader international context and on the
complex network of international interactions and relationships in order to argue that all
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these developments harm individuals and nations, affect their identity, decrease their
importance.

3.4. History or Story?

In consequence, 'unlike the politicized inter - war period when fascists and Nazis
were actually struggling for power, much of the violent right - wing 'happenings' of
today are not very politics" (Merkl, 1997, 40). But on the other hand, they have a similar
destabilization potential; moreover, the Nazis parties did not enter the legislatures soon
after they had been created. Nowadays, we may notice the same evolution - first, there
were movements with a small political character, now we have right - wing parties in
parliaments. Nazis took advantage from people's frustrations and insatisfactions.
One important difference between the inter - war fascism and the neo - fascism is
that the latter has several ways of manifesting. In the case of the former, even though the
ideological developments and features differed across Europe, fascism itself was spread
and supported only through parties and parties platforms. For the last two decades, when
the fascism has started to rise again in Europe, there has been the "extreme right
subculture" that emerged first. Skinheads and other extremist gangs have evolved on the
European streets. As early as 1954 Fleming assumed that " fascism is gangsterism
personified" (41). But the 1980s and especially the 1990s have proved this assumption
enough.
One important attempt of contemporary fascism is the rewriting of history - the
way new emerging movements and parties reinterpret and position themselves in
relations with the inter - war fascism. According to the way they approach the history of
fascism, the new emerging movements and parties could be categorized in three main
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divisions: The recidivist form - which looks nostalgically to the past; the radical form which tries to reinterpret the Fascist tradition; and a hybrid form - which seeks to
synthesize fascism with other ideologies, especially populism (Eatwell 1995). Some
scholars argue even that there are no neo - fascist parties nowadays in Europe, but only
"New Populist" (Taggart 1995). This difference has been addressed earlier in the paper,
and as argued at that point, it would simply too much the situation and the ideological
question, if a clear line was drawn between populism and neo - fascism.
The New Right contrasts itself deliberately and constantly with the traditional
fascism. They know that Hitler's and Mussolini's times are gone, and that the modem
Europe would not accept and subscribe to an obsolete program and ideology from 1930s
(Laqueur 1996). In the aftermath of the World War Two all the former fascist states faced
the dilemma of how to deal with their past. Two main problems in the process of
(re)building nations after fascism were the incorporation of a negative past into the
collective memory, and the radical identity change (Joppke 1996). All the former fascist
states had two options: either to be continuous or discontinuous with their past. The same
dilemma is faced by the neo - fascist movements. But as mentioned above, they are
aware of the obsoleteness of some of the features of the traditional fascism and of the
danger of recalling people's ugly memories of the 1930s fascism. In consequence, most
of the new fascist movements avoid any reference to the past and focus only on the
present and especially on the future. The most important step made in the direction of
breaking any relationship with traditional fascism was the Holocaust Denial (Eatwell
1995; Griffin 2000).
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There are two important trends adopted by the new right - wing extremism,
namely the internationalization and the metapoliticization (Griffin 2000). The
Europeanization of fascism has been mentioned earlier in the paper, it will be broadly
discussed later on. But the second feature is more interesting at this point of discussion.
The metapoliticization was also a characteristic of the 1930s fascism. It meant that the
fascist leaders and organizers were able "to take over the state as a new type of force in
modem politics which combined four components: an electoral party, a paramilitary
army, a mass social movement, and an effervescent ideological discourse" (Griffin 2000).
These developments are interesting and useful in the respect of the current events
and developments across Europe. Some scholars argued that the success on the streets did
not mean success in the electoral arena (Backes and Mudde 2000). Others have aimed to
prove that "an extremist, authoritarian movement. .. may indeed be able to mobilize the
politically apathetic while it is still in a relatively early stage of development - provided
social conditions are such that the extremist appeal will seem relevant to the immediately
perceived needs of these persons" (O'Lessker 1968, 69). In support for this latter
assumption, Blinkhom (2000) argues that, in the case of traditional fascism, the transition
from movement to regime was very slow but very sustained, and that the ideological
support transformed rather quickly into electoral support.
If it was to argue how and why the right - wing extremist parties penetrate the

political arena and the legislatures, another study, completely different, would be
developed. It is not the subject of this thesis to investigate why and how people move
toward electoral support for the right - wing extremist. Of importance for the hypothesis
in this study is to observe that there is an increasing trend of support for the right - wing
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parties in the electoral arena. As it will be argued in the next chapter of this paper, and as
most of the scholars have emphasized (Freeman 1997; Helms 1997; Ignazi 1992), the
main reason people move toward right is that they perceive the mainline parties as being
unrepresentative for their needs and expectancies any longer. The problems and the
challenges people face nowadays are too many and too complicated, and most of the
people instinctually move toward parties which address these sensitive issues and offer
discipline and order and the reestablishment of certain traditional well - known values.
As a summary finding, it might be assumed that the neo - fascist movements and
parties share little with traditional fascism in the respect of clear and concrete issues.
Time changed, people changed, society changed. But if we evaluated these issues in
terms of their deep meaning and content, we would find that there are many similarities
between traditional and new fascism. Both trends aimed to address people's needs of
security, stability, authority and discipline. Traditional fascists fought the enemies outside
(through territorial expansion); neo - fascists fight them inside (focusing mainly on the
immigrant groups). These observations and the findings explained and discussed above
support one of the hypotheses of this thesis, namely that fascism is not only an inter - war
European feature. In its main and deep characteristics it has emerged again for the last
two decades.
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Chapter 4
In the Four Corners of the Continent
4.1. East- West-North - South
As discussed earlier in this study, the right - wing extremism supports traditional
values, religion, and history - and in consequence nationalism is considered to be an
important feature of the extreme right (Fischer - Galati, 1993). Nationalism has been
studied from different perspectives, and the literature on this issue reveals various aspects
and elements of this phenomenon. One of them is of particular importance for the
purpose of this paper - namely the assumption that there is a Western nationalism which
is 'good' because it promotes progress and social homogeneity, and an Eastern
nationalism which is 'bad' because it determines rivalries, conflicts and heterogeneity
(Brubaker, 1996, McCrone, 1998, Auer, 2000).
Auer (2000, 22) assumes further that "differentiation between the two concepts of
nationalism can only be maintained by a purposeful interpretation of European
history ... the terms 'eastern' and 'western' are of little use, and indeed misleading, in
discussing nationalism because these terms can hardly be conceptualized without
geographical connotation". He accepts the fact that some forms of nationalism are more
likely to encourage the development of democracy and liberalism (emphasis added). But
these forms do not have anything to do with geographical delimitation. "Some forms of
liberal and illiberal nationalism do coexist within each European nation and, thus, an
analyst should be careful not to condemn a nation, because of its history, to be and
remain illiberal in its inclination" (Auer, 2000, 22). The idea is that the former
communist countries are not more exposed to right - wing extremism because of their
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'type' of nationalism. And in this respect, it is not to be forgotten the fact that nationalism
did legitimize both left - wing and right - wing dictatorships in Eastern Europe. The
traditional use of nationalism in Eastern Europe does not necessarily have a right - wing
orientation. The nationalism in Eastern Europe has always fulfilled people's need of
protecting the national identity; nationalism was less a question of political orientation,
and more a question of preserving the nation.
People in Eastern Europe felt always more threatened from outside than from
inside. In the case of Germany, for instance, the nationalism was oriented toward the
Jewish group within the society because they were perceived as endangering the German
nation and the "Arian race". In the case of Eastern European countries, the anti Semitism was part of the nationalist discourse, but not the core issue. Because the smaller
Eastern European countries were more likely to be subject of invasion and incorporation
into the empires around them than to be nationally threaten by the Jewish communities
within them, they developed a different type of nationalism. But this Eastern nationalism
gave birth to both Rightist and Leftist dictatorships, because anybody who assured the
people that he would preserve the national identity and the territory of the country was
welcome, no matter where on the political axis he was.
The Eastern European countries, ceteribus paribus, are as much exposed to right
extremism as the Western European countries. Auer (2000) makes a distinction between
"liberal" and "illiberal" nationalism, and he assumes that it is up to each former
communist country to choose which way it will follow. And the danger is that some of
these countries have chosen (or will choose) the "illiberal" type of nationalism (emphasis
added). It is not a regional pattern, it is about the particular choice of each country. The
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argument is that Eastern Europe, as much as Western Europe is exposed to the danger of
fascism and right - wing extremism. It is up to each country's politics whether it will
develop a liberal or illiberal type of nationalism.
On the other hand, there are scholars arguing that the right - wing extremism in
former communist Europe is a specific feature of the transition process from the
communist dictatorship to democracy. Szayna (1997) defines right extremism in this
region as "political movements characterized by suspect allegiance or downright rejection
of pluralism and authoritarian modes of rule" (p. 113). In the light of the previous
arguments, and following this approach, of importance for the hypothesis of this study is
to see whether the East European countries are more likely to adopt the "illiberal" type of
nationalism because of their geo - historical context.
Braun (1997) emphasizes some of the communist legacies in the region. First, he
discusses the fact than the lack of individual rights during Communist regimes generated
a feeling a frustration, because the individual was made to feel unimportant and
insignificant. Moreover, "communism inhibited the development of a more mature
political culture" (p. 145). The political systems themselves did not develop properly and
they did not have any experience of 'loyal opposition' when communist disappeared.
Because of the same legacy, "the role of law remains a crucial question in the
postcommunist states" (p. 148). And the last important thing is that "Communism created
not merely a new class of the privileged but also status societies" (p. 149).
These elements form a more controversial context for the political system
developing within the former communist countries. There is no evidence, however, that
they enhance the probability of right -wing extremism emergence. Mikenberg and
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Beichelt (2001) assume that the mam ongm of the right - wmg extremism is the
modernization process. Their observation is that "the radical right combines post industrial aspects such as the use of modem mass media, issue politic, and the decreasing
role of mass (party) organizations with the ideologies of a particular past, i.e. the mix of
traditional nationalism in the East and the legacy of state socialism" (p. 6).
The Eastern European countries have faced all the features of the post - modem
era without any transition; Communist rule disappeared and the countries had to adapt to
the world outside the Iron Curtain. People did not reject these new realities; moreover,
they were willing to join the rest of the world (namely the EU, NATO, and other
economic, political, and security international arrangements). But they had to face also
the dark sides of democracy and freedom - open market, unemployment, lack of statist
guarantees. Moreover, the region has been exposed to minority problems for a long time.
Communist rule kept all these conflict artificially under control, but they remained latent.
Once Communist regimes over, minorities' issues became again very sensitive.
Behind all these concrete reasons, it was the psychological impact of the new
world, where insecurity and fear and unknown were fundamental characteristics. As
discussed above, it is hard for people, generally speaking, to adapt to these realities. For
people born and raised under the Communist rule (which gave some guarantees and
certitudes) was even harder. The right - wing extremist and fascist features developed by
the Eastern European countries for the last 10 I 12 years are not a consequence of the past
but rather of the future. People in Eastern Europe face nowadays the same challenges as
people in Western Europe. They might have even harder times in adapting to the new
challenges and realities than people in Western Europe, because of the 50 years gap of
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gradual progress and change. This is not, however, a strong enough argument to prove
that only the Eastern Europeans are moving toward or are attracted to extremist features.
One argument sustaining the geographical homogeneity of the right - wing
extremism is the similitude of the issues people both in Eastern and in Western are more
concerned about. These are globalization, modernization, insecurity of their jobs,
insecurity of their future and so on. One important difference emerges and should be
taken into consideration when addressing the prevention of extremist spread in Europe. It
is the fact that the Western Europeans tend to blame immigrants for most of their
personal social and economic problems. First and foremost, they blame the immigration
for their unemployment. Secondly they blame the immigrant for the increases in crime
rates. The Eastern Europeans, on the other hand, show much support for the European
Union institutions and for the European integration as a whole. In the candidate states, the
economic and social policies of the EU have not had a direct effect and impact on the
people yet. The Euroskepticism is different in East and West. In the candidate countries,
the extremist discourse is constructed on the idea that the EU accession could be
beneficial for the country (especially for the economy), but national identity should be
very carefully preserved and defended when the country will become an EU member.
The EU accession is perceived as threatening the national identity more than the general
economic or social situation. In the Western countries, the neo - fascist discourse
emphasizes the disadvantages of the EU membership, especially the economic and social
ones (unemployment and criminality), immigrants and the "free movement of workers"
policy being blamed for that.
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These are very important observations both in the current 15 states - arrangement of
the European Union and in the perspective of an enlarged European Union. One of the
possible developments of neo - fascism features in Europe, in the perspective of the
enlargement, could be the Western perception that the new members are to be blamed for
the economic and social problems of the current members of the Union.
At a lower scale, this happened in the case of German reunification. The East
Germans were perceived as the "Germany's newest aliens", and their full integration in
the former Federal Republic of Germany is still in process (O'Brien 1997). The same
study indicates that, on the other hand, the East Germans were very open toward
integration into the former Federal Republic's society, and that they were willing to adopt
any necessary policy and change for full integration.
Another interesting lesson of the German case is represented by the findings of a
special Eurobarometer survey published in April 2001 by The European Monitoring
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. The subject of the research was the "attitudes
towards minority groups in West and East Germany". One major finding was that people
in West Germany are more likely to accept immigrants than people in East Germany. A
second one was that people in East Germany are more likely to blame minorities than
people in West Germany. And a third finding of importance was that the young East
Germans are more intolerant towards minorities than young West Germans. These three
observations could become further developments within the next accepted countries in
the European Union. They could become more intolerant among themselves, being open
towards the current EU member countries, but very hostile towards their current
accession partners. And there is another variable to be taken into consideration in the case
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of the current candidate countries; they still share historical rivalries and they all have
significant minority groups one within the others' boundaries. This variable could induce
even more tension and instability among them.
The rise and revival of fascism on the East - West axis is not an easy thing to define;
a dividing line East - West oversimplifies the situation and misses important aspects of
the relationships among the former Eastern bloc countries, among the current EU
members, and especially between these two groups. Immigration is an important process
all around Europe, and it cannot be stopped because freedom of movement represents one
of the main features of the European Union nowadays; moreover, the desired "closer
union" (Dinan 1999), and the intention of enlargement definitely involve increases in the
mobility of Europeans. In an Eurobarometer survey of 2001 focused on the youth in the
EU it was tested how the youth define the meaning of "being a citizen of Europe". The
first three features mentioned by young people in the 15 EU countries were: right to work
in any EU country (57%); right to move permanently to any EU country (51 %); and right
to study in any EU country (42%). Mobility is one of the core aspects of the EU and the
European integration. On the other hand, "increased prejudice, direct and indirect
discrimination, political opposition, and extensive violence are major European reactions
to the new minorities" (Pettigrew 1998, 90).
Most of the developments within the EU discussed above regard also the Northern
and Southern states of the continent. The Scandinavian countries have avoided parts of
the EU integration aspects (in Denmark and Sweden the EMU referendum failed), or the
accession as a whole (in Norway the EU accession referendum has already failed twice).
The economic aspects played an important role in this developments (Scandinavians
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feared that the EU membership would affect their countries' living standards; the fishing
and agricultural policies of the EU were not favorable to the national economies of these
countries; the environment standards of the EU have been perceived as harming the
higher Scandinavian standards and so on). Still "immigration has also been an issue in
EU relations, with fears that weaker borders within the EU will see a flood of people
arriving to draw on welfare. Prospective eastern enlargement has sharpened such
concerns. For Sweden in particular, membership of the EU has been seen as a challenge
to the country's traditional neutrality in international affairs" (Auger 2002, 17).
In the Southern part of Europe, since mid - 1970s, there is an increasing trend in
immigration, doubled by a decreasing trend in emigration. In the early years of the ECC,
the Southern part of the continent was a provider of legal or illegal emigrants for the rest
of the continent. Along with the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the European
Communities and their economic development and rising living standards, they have
started to become receiver countries of immigrants, especially from the Third World.
Their Mediterranean proximity to North Africa and their rather flexible visas
requirements (because all of them - Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece have always been
popular tourist destinations and countries of mass higher education - so tourist and
students visas were easier to be obtained in any of these countries than in the Northern
part of Europe) transformed them in migration destinations.
From the above facts it can be observed that the North - South European axis has not
developed different features than the East - West axis. The same migration trends and the
same neo - fascist, xenophobic, and racist reactions all around Europe, despite the
geographical direction. Figure 1 shows the current situation in Western Europe. If it is to
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attach the Eastern part of the continent to this map, we may see that in most of the
countries the electoral support for the nationalistic and/or xenophobic parties is actually
decreasing. In the Baltic states their electoral percentages were insignificant in the 2000
elections (1 - 2%); In Czech Republic (1998), the xenophobic Rally for the Republic
party won only 3.9% of the votes and it did not pass the electoral threshold to get into the
Parliament. But the more conservative Civic Democratic party, however, won 27.7% and
63 places in the Parliament. In Slovakia, the same year, the xenophobic Slovak
Nationalist Party won only 9.1 % of the votes and it got 14 places in the Parliament. These
two countries have elections this year, and it is interesting to see whether they will reject
their nationalist xenophobic parties as Hungary did in late - April, when the Party of
Justice and Life got 4.4% of the votes and it did not make it into the Parliament. In
Poland (2001), the League of Polish Families, Christian - nationalist, won 7.9% of votes
and 38 places in the Parliament. The only country where the nationalist - xenophobic
party won a significant electoral support was Romania (2001). But as it will be argued
later in the study, the causes of the support for the nationalist Party of Great Romania
were strongly related to internal features of the Romanian society, and much less related
to some "regional" issues.
As a summary of the above discussed arguments, findings, and facts, it may be
inferred that there is no such thing as "regional" neo - fascism (neither Eastern nor
Western; neither Northern nor Southern). There are some European features that push
toward neo - fascist developments, and if it is to differentiate geographically, we may
assume that the European Union countries are even more exposed to develop neo fascist attitudes and to encourage right - wing extremist political shifts. The more
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eastwards the EU will enlarge, the more likely it is to spread these features into its new
member states, the current (still) Eastern bloc.
One of the main hypotheses of this thesis can be considered as verified, namely that
there is no more likely geographical context for neo - fascism to emerge or develop.
There is certainly an European likelihood to shift to the right, but this is a trend all

around Europe, not only in the former Communist countries. In the next part of this
chapter I will investigate how the European Union addresses this problem and how
efficient are the measures it has already taken against the neo - fascist features arising
around the continent.

4.2. The vicious circle of the compass ... around Brussels

One inevitable question is what does the European Union do in respect of the rising
fascism and extremism around the continent? The European Union has begun to be
concerned about the issues of racism, xenophobia, and neo-fascism since the 1980s. The
first attempt to address these issues was in a Council Resolution in 1985 (OJ C186 of July
26, 1985). This Resolution was meant to establish "guidelines for a Community policy on
migration". In order to address the situation and the problems of the immigrants in the
Member States, this Resolution emphasized the need to improve the knowledge of the
immigrants about their rights (2(a)). It also stated that further consideration should be
given to better means of integrating the migrant workers into the host Member State's life
(2(b)). Another recommendation of the Resolution was the development of ways to
inform and to promote awareness, such as: "the adoption of a joint declaration
condemning xenophobia and racism; the setting up of pilot schemes for the organization
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of briefing sessions at local level for staff of local administrators who are in contact with
immigrants; the improvement of quality of free administrative assistance in areas such as
justice, education and housing, in particular through better information and linguistic help
in order that the quality of such services for migrant workers be equal to that available to
nationals of the Member States" (6).
Following this Resolution, yearly surveys on racism and xenophobia have been
conducted since 1988, and the results have been included in the Eurobarometer
publication series. Moreover, the European Parliament appointed three Commissions of
Enquiry on Racism and Xenophobia, in 1985, 1990, and 1993. These Commissions had
the objective to analyze the results of the surveys, to improve the questionnaire, and to
develop recommendations for addressing the problems resulting from the surveys.
The legal basis for these Commissions was threefold. First, the Preamble of the
1957 Treaty of Rome established that the EEC intends to take common action to
eliminate the barriers to social progress and to preserve "peace and liberty" within their
community. Second, the EC was legally bound (through the Treaty of Rome) to conform
and support the actions and the principles of the Council of Europe, one of them being
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. So the
EC had both the moral responsibility and the legal means to involve in addressing such
issues as racism and xenophobia. The third source of legitimacy for these Commissions
to be established was the requirement of the EC for all the state applying for membership
to be democracies. The EC must assure first that its members have and preserve their
democratic status, if it transformed the "democratic regime" into an accession criterion
(Genn and Lerman 1986).
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From one Commission to the next, the Commissions emphasized the need to
expand the interviews so that they would include, first of all, the reaction of the people in
Europe to the concept of immigrants in general, then to immigration from outside the
Community and, finally, to the phenomenon of immigration originating in the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe.v In 1997, the European Union established a permanent
organism to deal with the problems of racism and xenophobia in Europe. The European
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) has the role "to contribute to
combat racism, xenophobia and anti-semitism throughout Europe. The EUMC works
with the Council of Europe, the United Nations and other international organisations. It
has the task of reviewing the extent and development of the racist, xenophobic and
anti-semitic phenomena in the European Union and promoting "best practice" among the
Member States" (emphasis in the original Mission Statement text of the EUMC on their
site -

www.eumc.eu.int).

One of the first things the Centre made at the moment when it was established
was to synthesize the findings of the previous surveys, from 1989 - 1997. Ever since
1997, the EUMC has published every year an Annual Report about the findings regarding
racism and xenophobia in the previous year. In the 1989 - 1997 synthesis, the major
points were vi :
an increase in the "quite racist" or "very racist" self - image of the EU citizens
("Much more than in the survey carried out in 1989, the survey of 1997 reflects the
feeling of anxiety experienced by people in Europe, who are dissatisfied with their
personal situation, feel increasingly insecure of the future and regard foreigners as a
danger and therefore as something undesirable");
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an increase in the percentage of the people considering that foreigners were too
numerous in their country (from 37% in 1989 to 41%in1997);
a decrease of the importance of the fight against racism (from 56% in 1989 to 22% in
1997);
As regards the acceptance of persons originating from Eastern countries the level of
unrestricted acceptance has decreased both on the European level (14% in 1991 as
against 12% in 1997) and in specific countries, such as Germany (9% in 1991 as
against 3% in 1997);
The level of unrestricted acceptance of persons looking for political asylum in Europe
is decreasing in Europe (24% in 1991 as against 20% in 1997). The variations among
Member States are quite considerable in this connection.The level of restricted
acceptance, however, does not show such a drastic change (57% in 1991 as against
55% in 1997).
Another important finding of that synthesis was the one emphasizing the importance
and the confidence EU citizens had in the EU institutions that these were able to deal
with racist and xenophobic issues. In 1997, the EU institutions were considered an
"indispensable part" of the fight against those problems. Eighty-four percents of those
questioned said they were in favor of that role and would want to see it strengthened.
79% felt that the European institutions should adopt and implement legislation that would
prohibit racism, and 79% also felt that organizations that fight against racism should be
supported.
The European Union institutions have started to develop clearer policies against
discrimination since 1999. The Amsterdam Treaty (entered into force in May 1999)

53

reinforced the provisions governing human rights and fundamental freedoms at the heart
of the EU (Article 6 and Article 7 of the Treaty on the European Union - Maastricht
Treaty), and introduced a new Article 13 into the EC Treaty. Article 6 recalls the
commitments of the EU to defend human rights and basic freedoms. Article 7 introduces
the possibility for the EU to take some sanctions against a Member State that violates
fundamental rights and basic freedoms. Under the new Article 13, the Community
acquired for the first time, the power to take legislative action to combat racial
discrimination. These are the legal bases under which the EU institutions operate against
discrimination. Within this framework, the European Commission adopted a package of
anti - discrimination proposals implementing Article 13 of EC Treaty. Among these
proposals was included the draft directive on equal treatment irrespective of racial or
ethnic origin, which was adopted by the Council in June 2000. The directive
(2000/43/EC) sets out a binding framework for prohibiting racial discrimination
throughout the EU, and it must be implemented in the national laws of the Member States
by July 19, 2003.
Beside these legally bounding measures, the European Commission has moved
toward promoting a coherent strategy of integrating anti - racism into all the EU policies,
which is known as the principle of "mainstreaming". It involves mobilizing all general
policies and action by actively and visibly introducing consideration about the possible
impact on combating racism when drawing them up. Under this mainstreaming strategy
are included mainly employment and gender equality policies, but also external relations
(great importance being given to the policies designed to combat racism and to protect
minorities in the candidate countries), education and youth programs, and research.
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The European Union institutions are also very much involved in supporting anti racism projects such as: Community Action Programme to combat discrimination;
Community initiative EQUAL; Support for refugees; Grotius - the program of
cooperation in the field of police and judicial matters; and the European Initiative for
Democracy and Human Rights. Beside these, the most reinforcement of fundamental
rights and non - discrimination in the EU came with the proclamation of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights at the Nice European Council on 7 December 2000vii.
What are the outcomes of these policies and recommendation of the European
Commission in the Member States? The most recent Annual Report (2000) elaborated by
The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia does not provide very
optimistic results regarding both the racist and xenophobic trends in the EU countries and
the effectiveness of the policies meant to combat them. The Report observes "extensive
increases in racial violence, anti - Semitic attacks and racist threats" all around Europe,
with a 33% increase in Germany and a doubled increase in the UK. Discrimination is also
constantly reported in the EU Member States, especially regarding the labor market,
employment and occupation. The main target groups of violence and discrimination are
Roma, immigrants from North Africa, Bosnia and Albania - but Muslims are target
anyway, no matter their country of origin - and Jews. The Report also observes that some
of the Member States have already begun to enact legislation following the Council
Directive (2000/43/EC), and that most of them have adopted the principle of
mainstreaming recommended by the European Commission. At the same time, there are a
lot of initiatives taken by various actors to combat discrimination and promote cultural
diversity in the workplaces.
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Are these measures and initiatives enough? What can be observed in reality is that
the more policies and legal regulations there are, the more powerful neo - fascist features
become, and the more electoral support right - wing extremist parties get. We may infer
that the EU policies and approaches are not very efficient and that they do not properly
address the xenophobic and racist trends Europe faces today.
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Chapter 5
Austria and Romania
5.1. Leading Cases
Romania. The Romanian case of this country is a good one for some of the above

assumption. Following some of the arguments favorable to a specific right - wing
extremism pattern in Eastern Europe, Romania would have had many premises to
develop it earlier and stronger. The fascist tradition is not foreign to Romania. The Iron
Guard was an important organization within Eastern Europe at the beginning of 20th
century. Romania had the toughest communist regime in the region; and in consequence
the strongest legacy. Moreover, nationalism has ever been a strong feeling among
Romanians, especially because the Great Union of all the provinces took place only in
1918. The minority question is very sensitive especially because of the Hungarians living

in Transylvania, which is a tacitly disputed territory between Hungary and Romania.
There is also the Roma minority - another disputed ethnic group which generated
xenophobe feelings.
Even though all these elements have been there since the fall of communism,
Romanians have been and still are strong supporters of EU and NATO accession (in
2001, Romania was on the first place among the EU candidate countries in supporting the

accession - 80%; in trusting EU - 74%; and it had the highest percentage of desired
speed of integration - 6.13% ). They also encouraged their governments to privatize, to
open the economic market, to democratize. People wanted reform, democracy, and
capitalism. None of the elements presented above made them support in elections the
extreme right parties. In Table 3 are included the percentages obtained by the Greater
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Romania Party in 1992, 1996, 2000 elections. What one may see is that people did not
support this party as long as their hopes and expectances from democracy were still high.
When their living standard decreased heavily, when their economic situation became
more and more difficult, when they fully mistrusted all the institutions within the state,
when they considered that corruption dominated the society, and they have no other hope
and when they did not see any other exit, they voted for PRM and its leader, Corneliu
Vadim Tudor (November 2000).
It was a surprise for everybody that C.V. Tudor reached the second presidential

run with Ion Iliescu. But then he was defeated in the

2nd

run with a similar unexpected

large difference (see Table 4). Most of the people declared that they voted for C. V.
Tudor in the first tour just "to ring a bell", to make the politicians understand that they are
unsatisfied with the progress of reform and democratization. It was not a vote for the
nationalistic discourse of Vadim Tudor; it was not a deep extremism revival in the
Romanians' political views. It was only a vote against the way reforms and economy
went in the country, a way that did not fulfil the expectances of the electorate.
The right - wing extremist parties in Romania have been divided in two trends:
"radical continuity" and "radical return" (Shafir 1999). "Whereas parties of 'radical
return' look to the neotraditional values associated with fascist parties in the interwar
period and finds models in such leaders as ... Corneliu Zelea Codreanu ... , parties of
'radical continuity' take their bearings from communist legacy itself, looking thus to
Nicolae Ceausescu, for example, with admiration" (Shafir 1999, 213). The Greater
Romania Party is included in the 'radical continuity' category. It is another proof that
Romanians did not vote for traditional values of fascism and extremism, they have
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elected PRM because of reasons related to contemporary economic situation. Most of the
Romanians started to regret Ceausecu's time because of the certitudes the communist
regimes gave them (and the assumption is valid for other former communist countries as
well). Unemployment was not a problem, everybody got a house, and everybody afforded
a Romanian car. The basic needs were fulfilled at that time. If they wanted to subscribe to
the pure extremist ideology, they would have voted for a 'radical return' party. But they
have chosen PRM because they only wanted security, certitudes, and guarantees.

Austria. About the waves in right - wing emergence in the post - WWII Europe we
talked earlier in this paper. Betz (1998) identifies some particularities of the 'third wave'
(1980 - 2000, 1): "the extent to which various right - wing parties and movements have
successfully established themselves within roughly the same time span in a substantial
number of Western democracies; the extent to which they have managed to influence the
political discourse on a range of significant sociocultural and sociopolitical issues; and
the extent to which they have succeeded in gaining significant political offices and
positions".
Why that happened? The arguments discussed earlier allow us to assume that the
main reasons Europe has been facing a new 'wave' of extremism lately are the
socioeconomic and sociocultural changes. The post - industrialized era combined with
the EU enlargement and deepening have determined the rise of the right - wing parties.
The case of FPOE in Austria will illustrate these assumptions. It has developed for a
while, along with the economic changes within society, but it gained even more support
when economic changes started to be combined with Austrian accession into the EU.
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These two main issues were combined with a third one - "a growing xenophobia. It is not
always expressed openly although polls have shown growing hostility to foreigners even
whilst the number of foreign workers in the country has been declining. It is deteriorating
economic situation which explains the evolution of part of public opinion" (Harris 1994,
40).
The FPOE is a new phenomenon in post - war Austria. Nobody would have
expected a right - wing extremist party to emerge in this country, taking into
consideration its involvement in the WWII along with Nazist Germany. Since 1986,
FPOE has been developing and has increased in importance and electoral support, partly
also thanks to its new leader, Joerg Haider. His tough project of the "Third Republic" was
like a "war" declared to all the old parties. "Joerg Haider is not a Nazi in a any traditional
sense.

Ideologically,

his

party

does

not

stand

for

an

equivalent

of the

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (Nazi Party, NSDAP). The FPOE has
never developed any of the paramilitary trappings of the SA or other such
groups ... Furthermore, the FPOE under Haider has adopted a radically neo - liberal
economic policy, demanding full - scale privatization and the private tendering of public
services" (Morrow 2000, 60). Table 5 shows FPOE's electoral evolution since 1990. It
was an ascending line, without any significant ups and downs, but proving firm increase
in support.
From the above argument, we may observe that the links between contemporary
FPOE and traditional fascist right - wing are very weak, if existent at all. Haider did not
aim to bring to life again old stereotypes and frustrations. Because, as discussed earlier,
they would not have been valid any longer. Haider created a political platform with the
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aim to gain support from the new socially frustrated people. "In making direct appeals to
the voters and using the option of the popular initiative, Haider was mobilizing a new,
much more mobile political force, using highly emotive issue to undermine the
traditionally solid lines of Austrian political support" (Morrow 2000,52).
Joerg Haider did not construct the ideology party on old fascist patterns. He
followed the problems which were present in the contemporary society. On one hand he
focused on the economic insatisfactions, the unemployment problems, people's mistrust
towards politics and institutions; on the other hand he monopolized the EU accession's
opposition, emphasizing immigration issues with a xenophobe discourse. "Anti establishment, anti - partysm, anti - politics were the key issue of Haider policy" (Ignazi
1997, 59).
It is certain and accepted that he has never been a rebel, following the fascist

nostalgia of inter - war period. With such an approach he would have never gained any
support, because other problems are more sensitive for the Austrians nowadays, and
because also the Nazi issue is still very sensitive for Austria as an European state. But
Haider used different kind of strategy in order to be successful. "He has shrewdly
combined a program of sensible reform with a rhetoric of ethnocentric nationalism"
(Wistrich 2000). Haider knew how to speak out contemporary economic and social
problems in a tough, strong, xenophobe and nationalist discourse.
Haider has in common with the Romanian Vadim Tudor the fact that they only
had to speculate already present frustrations among people. They only needed to bring
those unsatisfied people together and transform them into their electorates. The major
difference is that FPOE has had a constant increase in public support, whereas PRM had
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the chance to be there when people's economic situation was difficult and their mistrust
in other institutions and parties very high.

5.2. Who is next?

At the moment I have started to focus on the study of fascism ideology, following
new developments in Europe (beginning of October 2001), the latest election gains of
right - wing parties in Western Europe were already 2 years old (Austria, Belgium, and
Switzerland), and in Eastern Europe almost an year (November 2000). A month later
after this research began (November 2001), the elections in Denmark brought the first
surprise - the nationalist Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) won 12% (22 places)
of parliament.
For 2002 some unpleasant surprises were expected in the elections of the Central
and East European countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia). Hungary passed the
test in late - April 2002, when the nationalist, xenophobic party of Justice and Life was
defeated in polls and it could not make to the parliament (it received only 4.4% of the
votes, not fulfilling the required threshold of 5% ). The Czech Republic and Slovakia will
have election this Summer and, respectively, this Fall. In Czech Republic, the center right party, the Democrat Civics, is likely to defeat the currently ruling Social - Democrat
Party. The leader of the Democratic Civics is a well - known euroskeptic, Vaclav Klaus,
and if his party wins, the Czech integration into the European Union will be seriously
endangered. The case of Slovakia is even worst because the former nationalist prime minister, Vladimir Meciar, is very likely to be elected again. NATO has already made
clear that Slovakia has little chances to be invited to join the Alliance at the Prague
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Summit because of these political developments; and if Meciar is elected indeed, then
Slovakia will not be definitely invited to join NATO.
In between these controversial elections, however, France held its presidential

elections the same weekend as the Hungarian parliamentary elections. If it has been to
follow some major trends in the literature, as argued earlier in the study, we would have
expected to see the victory of the Party of Justice and Life in Hungary, and the same old
rivalry in France - Jacques Chirac I Lionel Jospin. But the dies fell in the opposite part:
the nationalistic party was defeated in Hungary and Jean - Marie Le Pen made it to the
second run in France. Europe got crazy for the second time in three years; Le Pen
triumph is considered "one of the most significant events in post - war Europe" (Glover
2002).

Some have argued the Europeans are receptive to harsh anti - foreigner rhetoric
because rapid globalization had made them feel like they had lost control over their lives.
Fear of losing their jobs, economic problems, unemployment - all these are problems that
push people toward more radical political views. Others have argued that traditionally
centrist political establishment has brought the far right into play by losing touch with
citizens' daily struggles, The European Union accession and participation are important
factors that affect people's lives, and they are not particularly asked about many of the
policies taken in Brussels. Beside the accession referendum in some late - comer
countries, and the treaty referendum, the EU citizens are not consulted about anything
concerning their countries' participation and positions in the EU institutions. The
European Parliament elections are held once in four years, which seems not to be often
enough for EU citizens. Both lines of causes are viable and serious enough to be taken
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into consideration by the political elites in countries where the right - wing extremism
has already won, or is developing toward electoral success.
Le Pen's victory should be also understood as Jospin's defeat. The Left lost in
France, another important change in European politics. The Left lost a lot of its power
and capital of trust in 1989, after the East European revolutions. France, however,
remained one of the European bastions of the Left, with a serious tradition and an
important popular support. The vote against Jospin showed that people do not see the
Left as being a viable alternative for their expectances and insatisfactions any longer.
They move toward a more radical position because they perceive the Left being as
corrupted and unable to respond to their views and needs as the liberal, democrats, or
centrists.
"Europe 1s facing exciting times. Especially, because wherever right-wing
populists share government responsibilities the rules of democracy are changed. First,
there are attempts to place sympathizers in top positions in the media and to adapt the
programs to the populist aims. The second arena of political change is the legal system of
the respective countries. And quite often, an attempt is made to prepare the economic
structure for political interventions" (Der Standard 2002). Democracy is in danger not
only because of this changes; it is endangered by the anti - radical manifestations and
calls to the population. In France, for instance, there have been for the last week media
campaigns, intellectuals' public speeches, and all kind of appeals to the population not to
vote for Le Pen in the next run. Jacques Chirac, the other candidate in the second run,
refused any direct meeting with Le Pen on television; in schools, in universities,
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everybody teaches anybody else no to vote for Le Pen. The same happened in Romania
almost 3 years ago, after Vadim Tudor made it in the second run.
Glover (2002, 34), however, makes the point that "if we are democrats, we cannot
write off millions of voters simply because they make a choice we would not make. To
do so is to widen the gap between the governors and the governed". The solution is not to
impose to voters whom to vote with, or who to avoid. It makes no good, and it does not
help the trust of the people in "democratic" parties of forms or government. It is more
likely that Le Pen will not win the elections and will not become the president of France.
It is more likely that people only wanted to ring a bell for their governors that something

goes wrong and that people's needs and expectancies were not fulfilled. The same was
the case in Romania - voting Vadim Tudor for the second run, the electorate intended to
show to the democratic coalition that they were weak, corrupted and not representative
any longer. They also wanted to show to the elected president in the 2nd run that he was
not really desired, but he is only the lowest evil possible at that time.
It might be the same case for France in these presidential elections; if it is to look

at the pre - electoral situation, we may see that the atmosphere was very confused, the
number of candidates was a record in the history of the French Republic (16), the
political platforms were very similar, and it was clear that people would have a hard time
in making up their minds. The polls before the elections showed a high number of
undecided, but it was clear, at least for the mass media, that the polls were not able any
longer to correctly measure the situation. Out of this confusion, but at the same time,
paradoxically, lethargic certitude (the common sense assumption that 'probably the
candidates for the second run will be the same old Chirac I Jospin'), the political
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earthquake emerged. Chirac made it in the second run indeed (with 19.67%), but his
contra-candidate will be Jean -Marie Le Pen (with 17.02%), who defeated Lionel Jospin
(who won only 16.07% ).
Maybe the French only intended to show to their traditional political parties and
forces that they were not representative any longer and that there is always an alternative
for change, and that the electorate would not hesitate to switch toward parties and
movements that would be closer to them and more interested in the current day - to - day
needs and fears of the people. But even if it is the case in France, and Le Pen will be
defeated on May the 5th, the warning signal was pulled. It is up to the French elite to get
closer to the electorate and to try harder to answer to its needs. And this was not a signal
only for France; all the European countries should reevaluate their policies and possible
radical developments within each of them.
The first who feared other such developments around Europe, including their own
country, were the British. Few observers expect to see the British National Party gain the
kind of political support that similar right-wing extremist groups have in other European
countries such as France, Austria, Denmark, Italy or the Netherlands. Historically, the far
right has never won much support in Britain" (Wagner 2002, 66). But the elections in
France raised some concerns across the Great Britain as well, since in May there are local
elections and the British Nationalist Party has 668 candidates nationwide. Even though
the British find enough arguments against the idea that the right - wing extremism could
emerge in their country, they seemed to have understood very well the signal of Le Pen's
victory in France. "Successive governments have done little to promote integration. Of
course, integration is not necessarily a recipe for social harmony - it has not proved so in
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France - but segregation is surely more likely to lead to division and possibly conflict.
Many ordinary people resent continuing illegal immigration, as one unusually
perspicacious senior government minister has privately admitted to me. But the
Government seems unable or unwilling to do much about it. With the British record for
decency and moderation, it may seem fanciful to suppose that a home-grown Le Pen
might come along and successfully exploit this situation. Our first-past-the post political
system also makes it very difficult for extremist parties to gain much headway. This
explains why, in the past, racist politicians have had to shelter unobtrusively in the
margins of the Tory Party, and even of Labour. Nonetheless, the level of disenchantment
with mainstream political parties is high - as a turnout of only 58 per cent at the last
election suggests - and only a fool would say this presents no dangers" (Glover 2002, 38).
Le Pen's success might have beneficial effects, if parties and leaders in Europe

understood it as a wakeup call. If not, then more Le Pens will arise around Europe, and
some of them might actually win. It is early to evaluate how this European political event
has been understood around the continent and what type of attitudes and changes, if any,
it will determine in other European countries. Unfortunately, it is likely that most of the
European countries will adopt the line of thinking expressed by Simon Serfaty of the
Washington - based Center for Strategic and International Studies: "We're not about to
relive the 1930s in Europe. Europe has never been more democratic, never more
prosperous, never more secure than it is today" (Associated Press 2002).
Another approach and line of developments that, especially in the light of the
latest events, seems to be more viable and realistic. "The next elections to the European
Parliament will take place in 2004. It can no longer be ruled out that a broadly based
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right-wing populist list will be formed, which, in view of the widespread resentment, will
have a good chance of doing well. As has already been said several times in this respect,
Joerg Haider could be one of the initiators. And Austria might find itself in a role it has
already

played

once:

the

scene

of

a

switch

towards

authoritarian

times" (DerStandard2002 ).
In fact, no later than a month ago Haider was accused of offering electoral support
to a right - wing extremist party in Germany. The opposition Social Democrat Party in
Germany accused Joerg Haider of allowing to have his image on electoral posters with
the leader of the Free German People's Party (FDVP) in a campaign in Saxony - Anhalt
(Deutsche Presse - Agentur, March 14, 2002). And this is only one step taken by the
Austrian leader toward his aim of an Europenization of fascism, toward the unification of
all the movements across the continent. After the first run the French presidential
elections, he declared to the Austrian newspaper Der Standard: "It's not about an
organization. It's about people who want to change course, and there are a lot of people
involved in this mission" (Associated Press, April 24, 2002). So Haider still believes in
his mission and in the imminent spread of radical right among the Europeans.
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Conclusions
This thesis was intended to test two main hypotheses regarding the neo - fascism
re - emergence across Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. On one hand I assumed that neo fascism is not a particular characteristic of the Eastern European countries that are in the
process of transition to democracy; my assumption was that fascism could emerge
anywhere in Europe nowadays, with the same intensity and causing the same problems.
On the other hand I tested the hypothesis that the neo - fascism shares many fundamental
aspects with the traditional , inter - war one; my view on this issue was that the fascism is
not an historical feature that characterize only one moment and then it disappeared for
good. I argued that fascism still represents a threat for Europe; it is a ghost haunting the
continent.
It was mainly a qualitative case, based on comparative case studies and times

series analysis. I used some data provided by the national elections and by national or
European surveys in order to support the arguments made in the paper. I dedicated a
special part of the study to the cases of Austria and Romania because I considered them
to be representative for the main hypotheses tested. But other substantial evidences and
examples have been used from other European cases; I also discussed very recent
electoral developments involving right - wing extremist parties or leaders.
In order to prove argue that fascism is not an East European feature and that its
danger is equally shared by the whole Europe I identified and emphasized the common
elements which scare and concern people all around the continent. I argued that the
Communist legacy does not involve a likeliness to develop authoritarian attitudes; on the
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contrary, because that long time oppression, people in Eastern Europe are more open
toward European Union and are looking forward for the integration. I also argued that
usually the democratization process is not a cause for the emergence of fascism; an
exception was the case of Romania, where the very difficult economic situation and the
generalized corruption (as consequences of the democratization process) determined
people's tum toward radicalized positions.
I observed that the context provided by the European Union is more likely to
develop neo - fascist features. In the Western countries immigration is the main problem
and one of the pillars of the neo - fascist discourse. Unemployment, criminality and all
other socio - economic problems are considered to be immigrants' fault by the extremist
groups. As a logical consequence of these findings I inferred that the spread of neo fascist features and issues will go along with the European Union enlargement eastwards.
In this respect I analyzed the policies and measures the EU institutions have developed
and have proposed to the Member States in order to prevent and address the problem of
the rise of radicalism and xenophobia. My observations in this respect allow me to argue
that the European Union institutions have not chosen the most appropriate measures and
means for dealing with the neo - fascist emergence. The results have shown that the neo
- fascist tendencies are increasing around Europe despite the EU policies, or better said,
along with them.
The next focus was on the testing of the hypothesis that fascism was not a
particular feature of the inter - war Europe; I investigated the issues that drove people
toward fascism in the 1930 and I compared them with those of the 1990s. One main
observation was that the same basic feelings, fears and concerns drove people in both
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periods of time toward fascism. Insecurity, instability, economic and social problems these are the background elements necessary in a society in order to develop fascist
features. The neo - fascist movements and parties avoid to make any explicit reference to
the 1930s fascism; but they exploit the same weaknesses and feelings of the people. The
main difference is that nowadays fascists are oriented toward groups of people within
their countries, not outside their countries as they did in the 1930s. It is not about
territorial expansion any longer, and about imposing by force the "Arian race". It is about
integrating in some very limited ways the "others" within the society; the majority left
should be thrown away, if not worst, killed. There is nothing new both in the fears of the
people and in the way they react and the attitudes they develop. These cannot be isolated
moments in the history; these are permanent characteristics of the human nature that
cannot be changed and that are ready to explode each time people feel endangered or
aggressed.
The case studies and the examples and illustrations used along the study
strengthen these findings and the testing of the two initial hypotheses. Fascism is not
either a geographically or a temporarily insulated phenomenon. It could emerge at any
time, in any place in Europe, and the contemporary political, social, and economic
context of the European Union seems to provide a more and more favorable environment
for the emergence and the development of neo - fascist features.
This thesis offers a framework and background at the same time for further
studies and tests about European fascism. From ideological metamorphoses to electoral
support, a lot of hypotheses could be elaborated and tested. It is a broad and fascinating
enough subject to offer unexpected ways of inquiry and surprising answers. My aim was
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only to bring argument about contemporary approaches (both in the literature and at the
policy - making level) that consider fascism either an insulated phenomenon or an
irrelevant aspect of the contemporary Europe. I intended to develop a study as
comprehensive as possible in order to support my argument that fascism does exist, does
evolve, does develop, and could become an imminent threat. From now on, as argued
above, it is the task of other scholarly researches either to strengthen the arguments
discussed in this thesis or to take them on different paths of reasoning and arguing. This
study could also be considered as a very modest starting point for the elaboration of
further policies within the European Union in order to address the neo - fascism
emergence. I have not been particularly interested in developing and proposing
alternative policies within this study; this could also be a further development of the
modest contribution to the study of fascism I tried to make in my thesis.
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TABLE 1
LIST OF POLITICAL PARTIES THAT ARE GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO
BE PART OF THE EXTREME RIGHT PARTY FAMILY
OF WESTERN EUROPE (1980-95)

Country

Extreme right parties

Austria

- Freiheitliche Partei Osterreich (FPO)

Belgium

-AGIR
- Front National Belge (FNB)
- Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFNb)
- Vlaams Blok (VB)

Denmark

- Fremskridtspartiet (FPD)

France

- Alliance Populaire (AP)
- Front National (FN)
- Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFN)

Germany

- Deutsche Volksunion (DVU)
- Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)
- Republikaner (REP)

Greece

- Ethniki Politiki Enosis (EPEN)
- Enomeno Ethniko Kinema (ENEK)
- Alleanza Nazionale (AN)
- Lega Lombarda (LL)
- Lega Nord (LN)
- Lega Veneta (LV)
- Movimento Sociale Italiano-Destra Nazionale
(MSI-DN)

Italy

Luxembourg

- Nationalbewegong (NB)

Netherlands

- Centrumpartij (CP)
- Centrumdemocraten (CD)
- Centrumpartij'86/Nationale Volkspartij (CP'86)
- Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU)

Norway

- Fremskrittspartiet (FPN)

Portugal

- Forca Nacional-Nova Monarquia (FN-NM)
- Partido da Democracia Crista (PDC)
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- Partido de Solidariadade Nacional (PSN)
Spain

- Palange Espanola de las JONS (FE)
- Fuerza Nueva/Frente Nacional (FN/FN)
- Union Nacional (UN)

Sweden

- Ny Demokrati (ND)
- Sverigedemokratema (Sd)

Switzerland

- Lega dei Ticinesi (LT)
- Nationale Aktion fur Volk und Heimat (NA)
- Schweizer Autopartei/Parti Suisse des automobilistes(AB)
- Schweizer Demokraten/Democrates suisses (SD)
- Schweizerische Republikaner Bewegung/Mouvement
republicaine Suisse (SRB)
- Vigilance

United Kingdom

- British National Party (BNP)
- National Front (NF)

Source: Cas Mudde. 1996. "The war of words defining the extreme right party family."
West European Politics. 19(2): p225-49
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TABLE2
THREE FACES OF AUTHORITARIAN NATIONALISM
COUNTRY

FASCISTS

RADICAL RIGHT

Germany

NSDAP

Hugenburg, Papen,
Stahlhelm

Italy
Austria

PNF
NSDAP

ANI
Heimwehren

Belgium

Late Rex, late VNV,
Legion Nationale

Verdinaso

Estonia
Finland
France

Latvia
Lithuania
Mexico
Poland
Portugal
Romania
South Africa
Spain

Lapua/IKL
Faisceau; Francistes;
PPF;RNP
Arrow Cross, National
Socialists
Nat'l Soc/some
"Imperial Way"
Thunder Cross
Iron Wolf
Silver Shirts
Falanga, OZN
Nat'l Syndicalists
Iron Guard
Gray Shirts
Palange

Yugoslavia

Ustasa, Zbor

Hungary
Japan

Veterans' League
Acad. Karelia Society
AF, Jeunesses Pat,
Solidarite Francaise
"Right Radicals"
"Japanists", some
"Control"
Tautinikai
Cristeros/Sinarquistas
National Radicals
Integralists
National Christians
Ossewa-Brandwag
Carlists, Renovacion
Espagnola
Orjuna

CONSERVATIVE
RIGHT
Hindenburg, Bruening,
Schleicher,
Wirschaftspartei etc.
Sonnino, Salandra
Christian Socials,
Fatherland Front
Early rex, Early VNV
Pats
Mannerheim?
Croix de Feu; Vichy
Horthy, National Union
Party
Konoye/IRAA
Ulmanis
Smetona
PRI
Pilsudski, BBWR
Slazar/UN
Carolists, Manoilescu
National Union
CEDA
Alexander, Stojadinovic

Source: Payne, Stanley G. 1980. Fascism: Comparison and Definition. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press

82

TABLE3
Greater Romania Party (PRM) - Electoral Performance

Chamber of
Deputies
Senate

1992

1996

2000

3.9%

4%

19.5%

3.8%

7%

21%

Source: http://www.uxl.eiu.edu/-cfsdr/Romdata.htm

TABLE4
Presidential Election - November 2000
l 81 TOUR

2nd TOUR

Ion Iliescu

36.4%

66.8%

Corneliu Vadim Tudor

28.3%

33.2%

Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/

TABLES
Austrian Freedom Party (FPOE) - Electoral Performance

National
Council

1990

1994

1995

1999

16.6%

22.5%

21.8%

26.9%

Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
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The concept of "waves" in the development of the fascism in Europe has been introduced by Klaus von
Beyme. 1988. Right- Wing Extremism in Post - War Europe. West European Politics 11(2) (04/1988) ....
ii As an illustration of how these shopping - lists of fascism's characteristics could look lie, see for instance
Paul Hayes. 1973. Fascism. New York: Free Press, who identifies as features of fascism: (1) racism; (2) a
concept of an elite with an emphasis on the "charismatic leader'; (3) a notation of an all-inclusive
totalitarian state; (4) a commitment to nationalism,; to (5) socialism; and to (6) militarism; (7) a utilitarian
conception of economic processes; and (8) a disposition to employ force and violence in the pursuit of
political and national interests. Or another good illustration is Otto - Ernst Schueddekopf. 1973.
Revolutions of our Time: Fascism. New York: Praeger: (1) an opposition to the prevailing tendencies of
their era; (2) an extreme nationalism; (3) anti - individualism; (4) some kind of involvement with
socialism; (5) a transposition of the class struggle to the international level; (6) an addiction to elitism; (7)
an exploitation of military models and "an extreme racialism which usually appears in the form of anti semitism".
iii I own this classification to Roger Eatwell - The Rebirth of the 'Extreme Right' in Western Europe? who
used it when investigating the electoral breakthrough of the new right - wing extremism parties in Europe.
I considered this classification as very useful for discussing the levels where fascism emerges and develops.
iv The scholars arguing the end of ideology were primarily: Raymond Aron. 1955. "Fin de l'ideologie?". In
T.W. Adorno, and W Dirks (Eds.) Sociologica, Frankfurt. Raymond Aron. 1962. The opium of the the
Intellectuals. New York. Edward Shils. 1955. "The End of Ideology?" Encounter, 5: 52-58. Danile Bell.
1960. The End of Ideology. Glencoe, Ill. S.M. Lipset. 1960. Political Man. Garden City.
v This evaluation of the standards of the EP Commission was given on the European Monitoring Centre on
Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) web site, at: www.eumc.eu.int/publications/eurobarometer.htm
vi at: www.eumc.eu.int/publications/eurobarometer.htm
vii All these information are available at: www.eumc.eu.int and europa.eu.int
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